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Can Competition
Considerations Trump
Trademarks RIGHTS?
IOANNIS KOKKORIS*

ABSTRACT
Competition law has in the past tended to see suspiciously the
protection of trademark as directly opposed to the goals of competition law.
As this paper shows this view has been abandoned and substituted by a
more synthetic approach in which the goals of trademark law and
competition law are not incompatible but may be pursued conjunctly. The
paper discusses the importance and practical feasibility of striking a
balance between competition law and trademark rights, with a specific
attention to the specificities of trademarks. The paper will focus on the
issue of the compatibility between the goals of trademark law and
competition, and by analyzing the competition case law it provides a
careful insight of how the balance is struck in the decisional practice. The
paper shows that the “internalisation” of competition law considerations
when dealing with trademark issues and vice versa certainly affects the
reasoning of the courts. The choice of considering an issue from the point
of view of either trademark law or competition law empowers the courts to
address the same issue in a completely different manner and come to a
different conclusion. It remains to be assessed whether, in future cases, the
characterization of a case as an IP or a competition law case by the courts
will also have a bearing, given the profound consequences for the structure
of the analysis that is performed by the adjudicator, and, in turn, on the
final outcome of the case of such a choice.
* The author would like to express his gratitude to Dr Claudia Lemus for her excellent research
assistance.
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1. INTRODUCTION – THE TENSION BETWEEN COMPETITION LAW AND IP
RIGHTS
The relationship between competition law and intellectual property
rights is not only very close, but a very intricate one.1 One of the ultimate –
indirect – goals of these two areas of law is the same: favoring progress and
innovation in any specific industry.2 The way in which this goal is pursued,
however, is radically different, if not opposite.3 While competition law is
aimed at promoting the freedom of competition in the market and, with
some exceptions in specific markets, deregulation, the aim of intellectual
property law is to protect the IP-right holders and, as a result, limiting
competition against them whenever they satisfy specific criteria.4
Trademark law is aimed at protecting, on the one hand, the public,
because it acts as an indicator of origin and a guarantee of quality and, in
1. Steven D. Anderman, The Competition Law/IP ‘interface’: An introductory note in THE
INTERFACE BETWEEN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND COMPETITION POLICY 1
(Steven D. Anderman ed., 2007).
2. See id.
3. See id.
4. See Ioannis Lianos, Competition Law and Intellectual Property Rights: Is the Property
Rights’ Approach Right?, in CAMBRIDGE YEARBOOK OF EUROPEAN LEGAL STUDIES 153 (2006).
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doing so, reassures the consumers that they are getting the products they
want to get,5 and, on the other hand, the owner of the trademark, who “has
spent energy, time and money in presenting to the public the product [so
that] he is protected in his investment from its misappropriation by pirates
and cheats”.6 However, with the development of trademark law and
international exchanges, the scope of trademark has expanded steadily, to
the point that some commentators have criticized the excessive protection
that trademark owners currently enjoy, with trademarks granted too easily
and with rights attached to them becoming too pervasive.7 The reasons for
such expansion were mainly found in the process of conceptualization of
the trademark as a “property”. This has led to the IP right holders to enjoy a
wide array of safeguards, including at the constitutional level in the EU and
in the Member States.8
This enhanced status might have, in turn, come at the expenses of
either other undertakings in the market or the public interest itself.9 Within
this last category of conflicting interests it is possible to also include
competition law and the pursuance of its immediate goals: namely,
consumer welfare, efficiency, as well as, in the EU, market integration. In
fact, some commentators contend that the interface between intellectual
property and competition law is biased in favor of IP rights,10 and that this
is mainly due previously mentioned predominance that is attributed to the
safeguard of trademarks intended as properties.
Being the purposes of intellectual property rights undeniably
important and their role not negligible, the interaction between the two
fields of law is as much frequent as it is complex. One of the most relevant
areas of intersection between intellectual property and competition law has
historically been that of standard essential patents, and certainly it is not a
casualty that in this area of law commitment decisions under Article 9 of

5. Jennifer Davis, To protect or serve? European trademark law and the decline of the public
interest, 25 (4) E.I.P.R. 183, 180-187 (2003).
6. S. Rep. No. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1946).
7. Andrew Beckerman-Rodau, The Problem with Intellectual Property Rights: Subject Matter
Expansion, 13 Yale J.L. & TECH 45-46 (2011); Irene Calboli, Trademark Assignment “With
Goodwill”: A Concept Whose Time has Gone, 57 FLA. L. REV. 771, 774-75 (2005); Mark A. Lemley,
The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense, 108 YALE L.J. 1687 (1999).
8. At the EU level, see the first additional Protocol of the European Convention of Human
Rights.
9. Davis, supra note 5, at 183.
10. See Ioannis Lianos, Competition Law and Intellectual Property (IP) Rights: Analysis, Cases
and Materials, in COMPETITION LAW 20 (Ioannis Lianos et al eds. 2017). Available at SSRN:
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2863814 or http://dx.doi.org/10/2139/ssrn.2863814
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Regulation (EC) 1/2003 have been particularly popular.11A commitment
decision, while requesting the undertaking to put an end to the infringement
and eliminate the restraint to competition in the market, is not a finding of
infringement.12 As such, the Commission decision to make the
commitments binding is less conclusive, also due to the great input given
by the interested company in its taking, compared to a regular prohibition
decision under Article 7 Regulation (EC) 1/2003.13
Cases like Rambus,14 Samsung15 and Huawei16 show how important,
yet difficult, it is to strike the right balance between, on the one side, the
preservation of free competition and the need to ensure that all companies
are provided with the opportunity to compete on a level playing field for
the benefit of consumers and, on the other side, making sure that all
companies have an incentive to improve constantly their products because
they will receive an appropriate and satisfying reward for their efforts. If no
royalties were attributed to the standard essential patent creator, there
would not be any incentive for it to create a patent in the first place.
However, high royalty fees have serious consequences on the possibility
for competitors to enter a specific market and, as a result, may create
significant barriers to entry. This results in difficulties found in balancing
IP protection with competition law.
A further reason of complication in striking the right balance between,
on the one hand, the defense of the right to distinguish the products and
protecting the character and the reputation which it conveys and, on the
other, ensuring that firms operate in an optimally working free market
economy is given by the respective interplay each of this subject matter has
with innovation and new economies.
There is an ongoing and lively debate on the ways in which
competition law should spur innovation. However, the necessity for the
debate is itself controversial. It is useful to recall the key issues of the
interplay between competition, IP rights and innovation. Purists might
consider that, in principle, competition law should not play any active role
11. Article 9 of the Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/ALL/?uri=celex%3A32003R0001
12. Article 13 of the Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/ALL/?uri=celex%3A32003R0001
13. Article 7 of the Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/ALL/?uri=celex%3A32003R0001
14. Case COMP/38.636, Rambus, OJ C 30, 6.2.2010, p. 17–18
15. Case AT.39939, Samsung, Enforcement of UMTS standard essential patents, OJ C 350,
4.10.2014, p. 8–10.
16. Case C-170/13, Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd v. ZTE Corp., ZTE Deutschland GmbH,,
ECLI:EU: C:2015:477.
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in fostering innovation and that the market should be left to evolve without
interferences.17 According to a widely held view amongst economists,
however, there is a strong link between innovation and social welfare.18 It
is generally thought that innovation needs to be encouraged because in a
free-market economy those companies which invest in innovation are not
adequately incentivized.19 This is due to the fact that the social return on
innovation that they get exceeds their individual return.20 According to one
of the most famous studies of the economist Kenneth J. Arrow, Nobel
Memorial Prize winner in Economic Science in 1972 with John R. Hicks,
there are prices which bring all markets into a “general”, simultaneous
equilibrium, whereby every item produced at the equilibrium price is
voluntarily purchased.21 The corollary of this proposition is that
competitive markets are efficient. In continuity with Adam Smith, Kenneth
J. Arrow demonstrated that the operation of the invisible hand of market
competition benefits society22 and, in a subsequent study, he demonstrated
how “the incentive to invent is less under monopolistic than under
competitive conditions but even in the latter case it will be less than is
socially desirable”.23
As a result,
companies will underinvest in both product and process innovation
because they may not be able to fully appropriate the value they generate
to consumers, because their investments may generate technological
externalities that they cannot monetize and/or because their innovations
are copied before they had obtained an appropriate rate of return. Recent

17. Einer Elhauge, Defining Better Monopolisation Standards, 56 STANFORD LAW REVIEW 2,
294-305 (2003); Louis. Kaplow, The Patent-Antitrust Intersection: A Reappraisal, 97 HARVARD LAW
REVIEW, 1817 (1984).
18. Stephen Haber, Patents and the Wealth of Nations, 23 GEORGE MASON LAW REVIEW, 811
(2015).
19. Robert D. Atkinson, Stephen Ezell, and Luke A. Stewart, The Global Innovation Policy Index
(Information
Technology
and
Innovation
Foundation,
March
2012),
69-71,
https://itif.org/publications/2012/03/08/global-innovation-policy-index; William Davidson and Donald
McFetridge, International Technology Transactions and the Theory of Firm, 32 JOURNAL OF
INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS, 253-64 (1984).
20. Jorge Padilla, Innovation, Competition and Economic Growth – An economist’s viewpoint,
Presentation to the Association of European Competition Law Judges, Compass Lexecon 1-2 (June
2016).
21. Michael M. Weinstein, Kenneth Arrow, Nobel-Winning Economist whose Influence Spanned
Decades,
Dies
at
95,
N.
Y.
TIMES,
(February
21,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/21/business/economy/kenneth-arrow-dead-nobel-laureate-ineconomics.html (last visited May 16, 2020).
22. See id.
23. Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention, in THE
RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FACTORS 609-626 (UniversitiesNational Bureau Committee for Economic Research, Committee on Economic Growth of the Social
Science Research Council ed., 1962).
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empirical evidence shows that the social return on innovation indeed
exceeds its private return. As a consequence, there is too little
innovation.24

One of the main consequences of these assumptions is that innovation
needs to be fostered to ensure productivity growth, increased employment
rate and wider consumer choice. Since one typical vehicle of innovation are
intellectual property rights, the use of competition law to foster innovation
is especially controversial because of the delicate fine-tuning exercise that
the integration between these two -sometimes opposing- forces require.
This paper will focus on the importance and practical feasibility of
striking this balance, particularly regarding the specificities of trademarks.
It will first examine the issue of the compatibility between the goals of
trademark law and competition from a general perspective, and then move
on to analyze the competition case law to provide a better insight of how
the balance is struck in the decisional practice of the European Courts. This
paper will conclude with an analysis of whether and in which
circumstances competition law considerations trump trademark protection
considerations. Although this paper will only cover the current academic
debate in the EU jurisdiction, the US jurisdiction will be also considered
where appropriate.
2. THE THEORETICAL BACKGROUND OF THE IP/COMPETITION LAW
TENSION25
In this section, a theoretical background is developed against which
the practical analysis of the case law can be embedded. First, a general
overview of the doctrinal discussion is given. Second, a framework for a
theory that addresses the tension between IP and competition law will be
developed.
2.1. The theoretical background in the doctrine
Even though there has been a dispute on whether IP rights are
justified, the utilitarian explanation seems to remain the consensus for

24. Padilla, supra note 20, at 1-2.
25. This tension between IP and competition law in the UK and Europe has been highlighted by
the President of the UK Supreme Court, in an article: Lord Neuberger, Intellectual Property in the
United Kingdom and Europe, 36 (11) E.I.P.R. 693 (2014). This section draws from: The
pharmaceutical sector between Patent Law and Competition Law in UK, in COMPETITION AND
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL SECTOR: AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE,
307 – 344 (Gabriella Muscolo & Giovanni Pitruzzella eds., 2016).
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justifying IP rights.26 In this line, “the essence and main objective of
intellectual property rights is to direct private interest towards the
achievement of the community goal of greater innovation and increasing
economic welfare.”27
The need to analyze the justification for granting a patent is triggered
by the tension between patent law and competition law.28 It is intensified
because patents are considered to be property rights, which results in a
strong legal protection that ‘could lead to a weak application or even nonapplication of competition law.’29In the pharmaceutical sector though, it
seems that currently competition authorities ensure that competition law is
applied in patent related cases. Therefore, even if patents are regarded as
being strong property rights, competition law still seems to break this veil
of protection to the benefit of consumers and competitive markets. Viewing
IP rights as equals to property rights therefore is not fully relevant in the
pharmaceutical sector.
IP rights and especially patents are special because they confer
exclusionary rights upon the holder, which fits uncomfortably with
competition values.30 If one follows the view, that intellectual property
rights should not be regarded as quasi-physical property rights but rather as
“a form of industry specific regulation,”31 the “absence of a continuous
relationship” between IP and competition and the isolation of the two
disciplines can be overcome. More specifically, in order to overcome the
“disconnect” between IP and competition one should abandon the view that
the two disciplines are completely autonomous; and on the contrary
introduce a lively and continuous open relationship. Others consider that is
wrong to make intellectual property rights equivalent with normal property
rights, suggesting that IP rights should be seen through the lens of liability
rules instead.32

26. Ioannis Lianos, A Regulatory Theory of IP: Implications for Competition Law 2 (Univ. Coll.
London, Ctr. For Law, Econ. & Soc’y. Working Paper Series 1/2008, Nov. 2008). Available at
https://www.ucl.ac.uk/cles/research-paper-series/research-papers/cles-1-2008.
27. See id. at. 2.
28. See id. at. 4.
29. See id.
30. Ian S. Forrester, Regulating Intellectual Property Via Competition? Or Regulating
Competition Via Intellectual Property? Competition and Intellectual Property: Ten Years On, The
Debate Still Flourishes in EUROPEAN COMPETITION LAW ANNUAL 2005: THE INTERACTION BETWEEN
COMPETITION LAW AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 61 (Claus-Dieter Ehlermann & Isabela
Atanasiu eds., 1st ed. 2007).
31. Lianos, supra note 10, at 7.
32. Mark A. Lemley & Philip J. Weiser, Should property or liability rules govern information, 85
TEX. L. REV. 783 (2006).
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Another starting point to explain the role of IP when confronted with
competition is a theory of separation designed from an economic point of
view by Régibeau and Rockett, which highlights the distinguishing
functions of the two disciplines.33 The function of IP law should only be
the assignment and defense of IP whereas the function of competition law
should only be the scrutiny of the use of IP rights34 This theoretical
approach might harmonize the tension between IP and competition as it
sets clear boundaries for each discipline to prevent conflict. This theory
also seems to reverberate in the argument that competition law should not
be applied to situations where the patents are valid from the point of view
of patent law.35 However, even if patent holders observe a regulatory
system of patent law, there are scenarios where this theory of separation
falls short of being a remedy for possible anti-competitive harm.36
These different regulatory theories of IP might be used in this context
to exemplify and to analyze in how far competition law and IP related
arguments shall be taken into account in a given case and, more
importantly, to what extent they should be weighed and put on the
balance.37
2.2. A theory of practical concordance between IP and competition law
We suggest a theory that draws heavily on the insights of
constitutional law known as the theory of practical concordance. This
theory tries to balance the interests of IP law and competition law to an
optimal extent. The theory of practical concordance (‘Praktische
Konkordanz’) developed by K. Hesse in the framework of constitutional
law tries to balance different colliding fundamental rights and has as its aim
to come to a harmonious balancing of the two conflicting rights by
enabling each right to fulfil its optimal efficacy.38
33. Pierre Regibeau and Katharine Rockett, The Relationship between Intellectual Property Law
and Competition Law: An economic Approach in THE INTERFACE BETWEEN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
AND COMPETITION POLICY, 2 (Steven D. Anderman ed., 2007).
34. See id.
35. Josef Drexl, AstraZeneca and the EU Sector Inquiry: When Do Patent Filings Violate
Competition Law?, Max Planck Institute for Intellectual Property & Competition Law Research Paper
[1], (2012); see also JOSEF DREXL, AstraZeneca and the EU sector inquiry: when do patent filings
violate competition law? in PHARMACEUTICAL INNOVATION, COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW – A
TRILATERAL PERSPECTIVE 294 (Josef Drexl & Na Ri Lee eds., 2013).
36. Pierre Regibeau & Katharine Rockett, Revising the Technology Transfer Guidelines report
prepared for the European Commision 10 (2012). The report indicates that ‘even behaviour that follows
the letter of IP regulations can be found to be abusive if a patent-holder essentially “games” the IP
system with the intent and/or effect of hampering competition’.
37. Lianos, supra note 26, at 6.
38. Konrad Hesse, Grundzüge des Verfassungsrechts der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 317
(1999).
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Applied to the tension between IP law and competition law, this
theory implies that authorities and courts should try to allow the maximum
possible unfolding of the respective interests of the discipline and decide
the case by enabling each right to profit from optimal efficacy.39 This
means on the one hand, that IP rights should not be touched in their core
value, which is at the heart of and the very reason for applying for and
granting patents. The present theory therefore suggests that for each of the
two disciplines, there exist three different sets of stages of values.40 This
three-stage model could be described as similar to the model of the earth.
First, there exist core values that are immovable and fixed. On the patent
law side, this means that the patent cannot be modified in its existence by
any competition law consideration.41 On the competition law side this
means that the core values of the competition rules, such as the abuse of a
dominant position, can never be justified by patent law.42
Second, in exceptional circumstances it is plausible that the goal of
one discipline could be overridden by a superior goal of the other
discipline.43 This is the crucial stage where the balancing act usually is
taking place and where most of the cases at the frontier of IP and
competition will be situated.44 On the patent side this means that the full
protection of the patent system cannot help the patent holder to justify a
potentially abusive behavior under the competition rules.45 However, with
regard to the middle values, it needs to be taken into account that under this
balancing, competition law does not touch patent law in its core value but
rather in line with the jurisprudence of the ECJ, only competition law
sanctions the use of the patent.46
Third and finally, there are outer values that are less important and not
essential for the existence of the rights governed by the discipline, meaning
they can be abandoned due to the necessities of another discipline.47 For IP
this means that although a patent grants some form of market power to the

39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
Michael A. Carrier, Unraveling the Patent-Antitrust Paradox, 150 UNIVERSITY OF
PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW 3, 768-769 (January 2002).
46. Floris O. W. Vogelaar, The Compulsory License of Intellectual Property Rights Under the EC
Competition Rules: an Analysis of the Exception to the General Rule of Ownership Immunity From
Competition Rules, 6 THE COMPETITION LAW REVIEW 117 (2009).
47. See Hesse supra note 38, at 317.
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patent holder, it is justified by the necessity to incentivize innovation.48 On
the competition law side, this means that competition law is not precluded
from being applicable but must tolerate the granting of IP rights.49
In order to exemplify this theory, we use the typical pay-for-delay
scenario where the originator company who holds a patent and a secondary
process patent for a drug enters into patent settlement agreements with
generic companies in order to prevent them from entering the market.50
The Commission is not interested in attacking the validity of the
patent itself, and therefore does not question the core values of IP. The
Commission is rather concerned about the use of the patent. However, it
identifies that the limitations imposed on the generic companies in the
framework of the patent settlement agreement remain within the scope of
the patent, such as not entering the market with the generic version against
a payment that is close to the profits that could have been generated by
entering the market. It therefore recognizes that the patent covers the
practices of the dominant company. However, in the present scenario we
are confronted with the second stage of the middle-values, where the
practice of the pharmaceutical company seems to be within the boundaries
of the IP discipline but is in conflict with the competition rules. We
therefore would need an overriding goal or exceptional circumstances.
In Lundbeck, the Commission considered that originator and generic
companies were potential competitors, that the agreement led the generic
companies to limit its independent efforts to compete on the market, and
that the incentives to compete were reduced by the value transfer from
originator to generic companies.51 The overriding goal in the specific facts
of the case was to enable market entry and maintain competitive efforts in
the market for the specific drug.52 Therefore, the balancing test needs to
solve this dilemma. Using the model of the three different stages, by
sanctioning the behavior under the competition rules, the competition
authority does not interfere with the core values of IP. It merely is
concerned with the anticompetitive behavior and usage of the patent
system, which violates the rules prohibiting an abuse of a dominant

48. FREDERIC M. SCHERER & DAVID ROSS, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE 621-624 (3d ed. 1990).
49. James Turney, Defining the Limits of the EU Essential Facilities Doctrine on Intellectual
Property Rights: The Primacy of Securing Optimal Innovation, 3 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP.
180, 190 (2005).
50. Based on the Lundbeck decision of the European Commission.
51. Case T-472/13 Lundbeck v Commission.
52. See id.
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position. The limit imposed on the behavior of the patent holder is therefore
posed by the competition rules.
Practitioners and enforcers can embrace this theory as a tool to help
them decide whether the IP or the competition narrative shall prevail in a
given case.
3. THE “COMPETITION PLUS” PERSPECTIVE AND THE IP/COMPETITION
DILEMMA WITHIN A BROADER ECONOMIC POLICY CONTEXT
This section suggests a policy framework positioning patent law
within a competitive market. This will take a “competition plus”
perspective, considering not only competition law in the strict sense but
also the need for open and innovative competitive markets.
Competition law does not stand alone in the law system but is
embedded in the broader context of the economic law and policy. Neither
the UK or the EU have, as their single economic policy, a goal to maintain
competitive markets and to ensure that the competition rules are observed.
On the contrary, the UK and the EU are concerned with innovation,
economic growth and stability, jobs and the economy as a whole. Within
this policy framework, IP and competition policy have their place. For
example, competition law sometimes has to make way because of bigger
economic policy goals53 such as the stability of the UK financial system, as
is evidenced by the ‘public interest intervention’ in merger law used in the
merger case Lloyds TSB/ HBOS54
This can also be seen in the way European competition law and policy
is situated in the Juncker-Commission, where competition policy has been
positioned within the broader goal of growth and economic stability.55 In
this view, competition policy serves different goals.56 The goals are
broader than the mere application of the competition rules to create a
competitive marketplace and should also serve and foster the other
53. For a German case considering job security in a competition case, see the merger of
Kali+Salz/PCS, Bundesminister für Wirtschaft, Verfügung vom vom 22.7.1997, IB6-220840/112,
WuW vom 09.09.1997, Heft 09, 743 – 750.
54. See
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/alex-chisholm-speaks-about-public-interestand-competition-based-merger-control (last visited July 14, 2015).
55. ‘Mobilising competition policy tools and market expertise so that they contribute, as
appropriate, to our jobs and growth agenda. . .in this context, it will be important to keep developing an
economic as well as a legal approach to the assessment of competition issues and to further develop
market monitoring in support of the broader activities of the Commission’, Mission Letter to
Commissioner
for
Competition,
1.
November
2014,
http://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/cwt/files/commissioner_mission_letters/vestager_en.pdf
(last
visited July 12, 2015).
56. See id.
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economic policy goals foreseen by the EU Commission’s agenda.57 This
competition plus approach therefore seems to already play a major role at
European level in competition policy enforcement. Additionally, the launch
of the sector inquiry into the E-commerce sector shows that this
competition approach is launched within the framework of the
Commission’s Digital Single Market Strategy.58 Considering the above
examples, it could be concluded that the goals of economic policy
associated with strong and enforceable IP rights are important to create
growth and innovation, notably in the pharmaceutical industry.59 Therefore,
competition law is intrinsically linked to IP when it comes to creating
growth and innovation in the economy.
The pharma industry, for example, relies on the protection of its
innovations via IP rights (notably patents) to justify the huge investments in
new and innovative medicines.60 The generic competitors and the general
interest, however, are also interested in cheaper medicines and lower
reimbursement costs for drugs and therefore open and competitive markets.
A competition plus approach could, therefore, consider the specificities of
patents for the pharmaceutical industry and that certain practices are
justified by patent law and policy considerations and should not be
disturbed by the application of competition law.
The ECJ’s line of thought on the balance between IP and competition
law is to some extent revealed in the AstraZeneca judgment where the
Court ruled that “the illegality of abusive conduct under Article [102
TFEU] is unrelated to its compliance or non-compliance with other legal
rules and, in the majority of cases, abuses of dominant positions consist of
behavior which is otherwise lawful under branches of law other than
competition law.”61 In other words, the Court tries to say that even if an
undertaking acts lawfully under the patent rules, general law and
administrative procedures of a member state, competition law can still
interfere with the undertaking’s conduct if there is an abuse of competition
law. So, even if acquiring a patent does not mean a dominant position nor
the abuse of that dominant position, this ruling gives the impression of
57. European Commission, The Digital Services Act: ensuring a safe and accountable online
environment,
https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/priorities-2019-2024/europe-fit-digital-age/digitalservices-act-ensuring-safe-and-accountable-online-environment_en (last visited January 28, 2021).
58. European
Commission,
COM(2020)
842
final,
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/en/TXT/?qid=1608116887159&uri=COM%3A2020%3A842%3AFIN (last visited January 28,
2021).
59. Carrier, supra note 45, at 764.
60. C.T. TAYLOR & Z.A. SILBERSTON, THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE PATENT SYSTEM: A
STUDY OF THE BRITISH EXPERIENCE 251 (1973).
61. Drexl, supra note 35, at 132.

2021

CAN COMPETITION CONSIDERATIONS TRUMP TRADEMARKS RIGHTS?

103

competition law being the ‘driving force’ in the relationship of IP and
competition by disregarding other disciplines of law. Is competition law
therefore the trump card in situations of conflicting tendencies?
As regards the IP perspective, the literature has analyzed reasons for
defensive patenting strategies and has come up with explanations such as
the failure of patent law to restrict strategic patenting or even the failure of
the patent system to grant a sufficient protection to the originator company
of the patented medicine.62 Practice shows that the patent granting system
does not always function optimally, especially in the pharmaceutical sector,
wherein between 2000 and 2007 around 75% of the originator’s patents
were revoked in opposition or appeal procedures.63 This could suggest that
before a patent is granted, the patent office should more carefully analyze
the molecule that the pharmaceutical company is seeking to patent in order
to foresee and internalize likely competition problems. This need is
justified by the fact that challenging the validity of a patent is motivated by
generic companies to compete on the market. Competition law can be the
right tool to restore competition, which is sometimes hindered by the flaws
of the patent system.64 In this context some authors also speak of
“probabilistic patents,”65 as there is always the danger of the patent being
invalidated by the patent office or the court.66
While some view competition law as a repairing tool for patent
law,67others claim that competition law is not the right tool to address the
failures of the patent system. Those authors fear a possible hindering of
innovation and competition if competition law interferes with patents.
Others draw from the case law and the evolving pattern of competition law
enforcement that the competition rules have advanced to become a “second
tier regulation”68 over IPRs. They are of the opinion that competition law
62. Nicoleta Tuominen, An IP Perspective on Defensive Patenting Strategies of the EU
Pharmaceutical Industry, E.I.P.R., 541 (2012).
63. European Commission, final Report on its competition inquiry into the pharmaceutical sector,
pursuant to Article 17 of Regulation 1/2003 EC of 8 July 2009, 11.
64. See CHRISTINA BOHANNAN & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, CREATION WITHOUT RESTRAINT:
PROMOTING LIBERTY AND RIVALRY INNOVATION 97 (2012) (offering a different view in the US
context: “antitrust does not offer a global fix for problems in the patent system.”).
65. See generally Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Probabilistic Patents, 19 ECON. PERSP. 75-98
(2005).
66. See id.
67. Rupprecht Podszun, Can Competition Law Repair Patent Law and Administrative
Procedures?, 281-94 CML Rev. (2014); contra A. Heinemann, Immaterialgüterschutz in der
Wettbewerbsordnung: eine grundlagenorientierte Untersuchung zum Kartellrecht des geistigen
Eigentums 25 (Mohr Siebeck, 2002) (stating in footnote 61 that competition law is no corrective (tool)
for intellectual property rights).
68. STEVEN ANDERMAN & HEDVIG SCHMIDT, EU COMPETITION LAW AND INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS - THE REGULATION OF INNOVATION 2 (2d ed. 2011).
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provides “an external system of regulation”69 which specifically addresses
anticompetitive conducts that the “internal”70 IP system is incapable of
preventing.71 It should be admitted that the circumstances for competition
law to intervene in a patent law situation shall be narrow and specific.
Nevertheless, if the conditions of Art. 102 TFEU are met, competition law
can intervene and solve a market failure problem. As is evidenced by the
Lundbeck decision of the European Commission, the view that “it will be
very difficult to demonstrate that patent strategies are abusive, especially
since the application of competition rules could interfere ‘with the patent
regime itself and its very rationale” has been proven wrong72 as the
European Commission found that the pharmaceutical undertaking
Lundbeck had abused its dominant position in violation of Art. 102
TFEU.73
Just as “competition is a key driver of technical development,”74
especially in the pharmaceutical sector, IP rights (most often in the form of
patents) are equally the best incentive for companies to invest in R&D for
the development of new drugs.75 Competition and IP rights can therefore
have the positive effect of enabling innovation and progress for the market
economy.
It needs to be stressed that competition law is not used to challenge the
existence as such of a patent of a pharmaceutical company.76 The UK and
EU laws foresee procedures and the criteria under which competitors can
challenge the validity of patents, but the existence of these rights is in a
way immune to competition law scrutiny.77 As is clear from the Reckitt
Benckiser decision, competition law only interferes with patent law, if the
sphere of the lawful exercise of the patent is left and the patent holder

69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

See id. at 4.
See id.
See id.
Tuominen, supra note 62, at 549-50.
Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.
DAMIEN GERADIN, ANNE LAYNE-FARRAR, & NICOLAS PETIT, EU COMPETITION LAW AND
ECONOMICS 34 (2012).
75. See VALENTINE KORAH, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE EC COMPETITION
RULES 2 (2006).1.2 (2006) (explaining that without the benefits and incentives of the patent,
pharmaceutical companies would never invest in R&D for some drugs).
76. Duncan Matthews and Olga Gurgula, Patent Strategies and Competition Law in the
Pharmaceutical Sector: Implications for Access to Medicines, Queen Mary School of Law Legal
Studies Research Paper No. 233/2016, available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2779014.
77. Tamar Khuchua, Different ‘Rules of the Game’ – Impact of National Court Systems on Patent
Litigation in the EU and the Need for New Perspectives, 10 JIPITEC 257 (2019).
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engages in practices that are not fully covered by the patent.78 This is the
situation in which the competition authorities in the UK and the EU suspect
anticompetitive behavior that cannot be justified by the mere exercise of
the existing patent. Nevertheless, it needs to be reminded that a patent is
not equal to having a dominant position. Even if a patent is a quasimonopoly right granting exclusionary powers on time, there can be similar
competing products on the market with market shares high enough to
prevent the existence of dominant positions. But if the authority can
establish a dominant position and identifies practices that are not normal
competition or competition on the merits, then the abusive behavior of the
dominant pharmaceutical company could be targeted by the competition
rules.
To sum up, the competition plus perspective seems to be the bestsuited approach to embrace the rationale of patent law into competition
policy and to overcome tensions between IP and competition by achieving
a harmonious relationship that creates innovation while safeguarding
competitive markets in the UK and the EU.
4. COMPATIBILITY AND INTERACTION BETWEEN TRADEMARK LAW AND
COMPETITION LAW

The function of trademarks is to distinguish the products of one
company from the product of another company. To fulfil this function,
trademarks may consist of any sign that is capable of being represented
graphically, including words, personal names, designs, letters, numbers,
drawing, pictures, emblems, or other graphic representations capable of
distinguishing goods or services. The registration of trademark may be
extended unlimitedly, in principle, provided that the registration is renewed
before expiry.
Due to the exclusive and durable nature79 of the registration of a
trademark, there has been a recurring concern that the protection offered by
a trademark could by itself lead to the creation of dominant positions in the
market. The “myth” of an association between the ownership of an IP right
and monopoly dates back a long time.80 According to a traditional
78. Squire Sanders Hammonds, OFT issues decision in Reckitt Benckiser abuse of dominance
investigation, Lexology (May 5, 2011), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=6ca4ee83bac4-4b2a-9489-b9baaf9147f5
79. The EU trademark is registered with EUIPO and it is valid for a period of 10 years but may be
renewed indefinitely.
80. James Turney, Defining the Limits of the EU Essential Facilities Doctrine on Intellectual
Property Rights: The Primacy of Securing Optimal Innovation, 3 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP.,
180 (2005).
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argument, innovators need to be rewarded for their creations with the
exclusive right to their expected economic returns to ensure a high level of
innovative activity.81
Even if the process of creation of new products may at times be
triggered by accidental discoveries or by human passion and creativity,82 it
still holds true that, in the majority of cases, there needs to be an economic
incentive supporting it.83 However, together with the protection afforded to
innovators by a system of patents, copyrights and trademarks, a certain
share of return is assigned to innovators. This share of return, albeit limited
in time, is exclusively assigned to them. It can be quantified as the
“difference between the competitive and the monopoly returns earned.”84
According to this classic approach, the implications of such a rigid
allocation of a share of return are the following: (i) that the IP right holder
will restrict the use of its innovative product in order to gain monopoly
profits; (ii) that the IP-protected innovation will not be duly exploited; and
(iii) that this underutilization will produce negative externalities because
competitors, instead of exploiting the original innovation, will need to
produce substitutes whenever they consider that the cost for it is lower than
the royalties for the use of the original innovation.85
Mainly based on these considerations, there has been a tendency in
identifying the protection afforded by IP rights with a situation of
monopoly.86 It has also been noted that many IP textbooks use patents as
an example of monopoly in IP rights.87 Tom Palmer called patents and
copyrights a form of “illegitimate state-granted monopoly,” arguing that if
patent rights had evolved under the common law similarly to trademarks,
they would not enjoy this status of an illegitimate monopoly.88 This status,
however, only refers to patents and copyright, because trademark rights,
according to Palmer, are assigned to the licensor as a result of a privately

81. Carrier, supra note 45, at 823-824.
82. FRITZ MACHLUP, THE PRODUCTION AND DISTRIBUTION OF KNOWLEDGE IN THE UNITED
STATES, 162-70 (1962).
83. See id.
84. Roger Meiners & Robert Staaf, Patents, Copyrights, and Trademarks: Property or Monopoly,
13 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 911, 913 (1990).
85. See id.
86. Romano Subiotto, The Right to Deal With Whom One Pleases Under EEC Competition Law:
A Small Contribution to a Necessary Debate, 13 E.C.L.R., 244 (1992).
87. Roger Meiners & Robert Staaf, Patents, Copyrights, and Trademarks: Property or Monopoly,
13 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y, 914 (1990).
88. Tom G. Palmer, Intellectual Property Rights: A Non-Posnerian Law and Economics
Approach, 12 HAMLINE L. REV. 263, 264-68, 280 (1989).
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negotiated agreement, instead of being constructed by statutory law.89 As
such, they are worthy of judicial enforcement.
While this argument is undoubtedly controversial and largely subject
to criticism,90 it is still useful to underline the noticeably different approach
to the interplay between trademarks and monopoly and any other IP rights.
Interestingly, proponents contend that while the existence of a system of
protection of intellectual property rights is necessary, patent and copyright,
unlike property right, create scarcity, do not result from it.91 As stated by
Plant, “the institution of private property makes for the preservation of
scarce goods, tending . . . to lead us to make the most of them, property
rights in patents and copyright make possible the creation of a scarcity of
the products appropriated which could not otherwise be maintained.”92
These observations, although disputable and in part corrected by more
modern utilitarian theories, help identifying a distinction between on the
one hand, the role copyrights and patents may have in the creation or
strengthening of a dominant position in the market, and, on the other hand,
the role of trademarks in this context.
In order to fully understand the conflict between trademark law and
competition law, however, it is also important to establish what are the
functions that each of these disciplines explicates in the practice. While
originally the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) had affirmed
the superior importance of the goal of free circulation of goods over the
interests of the trademark owner, stating in Van Zuylen Freres v HAG AG
that to prohibit “the marketing in a Member State of a product legally
bearing a trade mark in another Member State, for the sole reason that an
identical trade mark having the same origin exists in the first state, is
incompatible with the provisions providing for free movement of goods
within the Common Market.”93
This strict hierarchy was subsequently revised. In HAG II, the CJEU
clarified that trademark rights are “an essential element in the system of
undistorted competition which the Treaty seeks to establish and
maintain.”94 In addition, it was underlined that “an undertaking must be in
89. See id.
90. See generally Michael I. Krauss, Property, Monopoly, and Intellectual Rights, 12 HAMLINE L.
REV. 305 (1988-1989). Contending that patents are a combination of common law and statutory law and
that patents, copyrights, and trademarks (intellectual property) granted recognition by the state are
essentially the same as recognition by the state of claims in real property.
91. Arnold Plant, The Economic Theory Concerning Patents for Invention, 1 ECONOMICA 1, 3051 (1934); see also Palmer, supra note 88, at 279.
92. See Plant at 31.
93. Case 192/73, Van Zuylen frères v. Hag AG, ,1974 E.C.R. 744.
94. Case C-10/89, SA CNL-SUCAL NV v. HAG GF AG, 1990 E.C.R. I-3758.

108

CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP.

Vol 20:1

a position to keep its customers by virtue of the quality of its products and
services, something which is possible only if there are distinctive marks
which enable customers to identify those products and services.95
By recalling its jurisprudence in Hoffmann-La Roche v Centrafarm96
and Centrafarm v American Home Products Corporation,97 the CJEU
proceeded to state that the “essential function of the trade mark [sic] . . . is
to guarantee the identity of the origin of the marked product to the
consumer or ultimate user by enabling him without any possibility of
confusion to distinguish that product from products which have another
origin.”98
Subsequently, the Trademark Directive and the Community
Trademark Regulation entered into force.99 While they did not provide any
indication about the hierarchy between the protection of the free circulation
of goods and the protection of trademark rights, the provision contained in
the tenth recital of the preamble of the Trademark Directive clarified that
the function of registered trademarks was, in particular, to guarantee the
trademark as an indication of origin.100 In Philips Electronics, the CJEU
the same idea, recalling the tenth recital of the first Trademark Directive.101
Importantly, in L’Oréal, the CJEU stated that the functions of trademark
are multiple and that, beside the indication of the origin of the products,
they aim at protecting the quality of products, communication, investment
and advertising.102
As highlighted by other authors, there does not appear to be any innate
incompatibility between the protection of trademarks and competition law,
and, for these intellectual property rights, the philosophical and practical
tension existing for patents is not present.103 In particular, due to the fact
that trademarks also have a function of identification of products, allowing
consumers to choose between different products available in the market,
95. See id.
96. See generally Case 102/77, Hoffman-La Roche v. Centrafarm, 1978 E.C.R. 1140.
97. See generally Case 3/78, Centrafarm v. American Home Products Corporation, 1978 E.C.R.
1824.,
98. Case C-10/89, supra note 94, I-3758.
99. Trade Mark Regulation (EU) 2015/2424 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16
December 2015.
100. First Council Directive 89/104/EEC of 21 December 1988 to approximate the laws of the
Member States relating to trademarks, O.J (L 040) 11/02/1989, 1-7.
101. Case C-299/99, Koninklijke Philips ElectronicsElecs., NV v. Remington Consumer Products
Ltd., 2002 E.C.R. ¶ 29.
102. Case C-487/07, L’Oréal SA, Lancôme parfums et beauté & Cie SNC and Laboratoire Garnier
& Cie v Bellure NV, Malaika Invs., Ltd., and Starion Int’l Ltd., 2009 E.C.R. ¶ 58.
103. STEPHEN P. LADAS, PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND RELATED RIGHTS: NATIONAL AND
INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION 1357 (3rd ed. 1975).
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they essentially spur, and do not restrain, free competition. However, even
if the protection of trademark does not conflict with competition law in the
same immediate way in which patent law may, a series of issues may arise
from the fact that while trademark owners and consumers see their interests
aligned in the prevention of material consumer confusion as to source, their
interests may conflict in relation to other purposes of trademark law, in
particular the avoidance of other types of confusion and the issue of
competition.104
As previously noted,
trademark owners oppose competition generally. As a result, if an
unauthorized use creates confusion of any kind, whether material or
immaterial to consumer purchasing decisions, trademark owners will
seize upon it and use it as an excuse to shut down an unauthorized use,
without regard to the offsetting benefits, such as increased competition,
the use may create. Consumers, on the other hand, are intensely
interested in competition and the lower prices it can bring. In situations
where another's unauthorized use of a trademark both increases
competition and creates confusion, consumers will balance the benefits
of increased competition against the costs of increased confusion to
determine where their interests lie. In many cases, particularly where the
confusion is unlikely to materially influence consumer purchasing
decisions, consumers may favor increased competition even if it results
in some increased confusion.105

Due to their nature, trademarks usually do not enable their holder to
hinder the creation of a new product, or of a new market. This is because,
unlike copyright and patent rights, trademarks do not provide the input for
a new product or process and, as a result, they usually do not impede the
creation of an innovative product or of an improved process. However, they
may create barriers to entry.106
The ability of trademarks to operate as barriers to entry is dependent
on the specific circumstances of the case. In particular, while it is
undeniable that branding advertising may hinder access to the market of
new entrants, particularly in oligopolistic markets, thus reducing the overall
number of undertakings operating in the market, it is also true that such
barriers to entry may have the effect of reducing the number of trademarks

104. Glinn S. Lunney Jr., Trademarks and the Internet: The United States’ Experience, 97
TRADEMARK REP. 931, 932 (2007).
105. See id. at 932-33.
106. THORSTEN KASEBERG, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, ANTITRUST AND CUMULATIVE
INNOVATION IN THE EU AND THE US (2012).
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used in a specific sector, aligning it with the optimal number, particularly
when the cost of entry is very low.107
The consistency or the divergence of goals between competition law
and trademark protection is largely dependent on the way in which
trademark law is used by the owner.108 The interpretation and the
enforcement of trademark law can have a negative impact on competition
in multiple ways. One example is the broad interpretation of the descriptive
words used to determine the scope of the right that could prevent
undertakings from registering trademarks for competitor products. Another
example is the “monopolization” by means of the trademark registration of
the common form or appearance of the product. Similarly, trademark
protection could be misused in conjunction with the abuse of a dominant
position in the market or, more frequently, in the case of agreements in
which trademarks are used to restrict trade.109 Therefore, all the economic
and legal circumstances and the relevant market must be considered, before
it is possible to draw conclusions regarding the use of trademarks as
anticompetitive barriers to entry.110
In the U.S., the approach is different. In such a jurisdiction, the judge
expressly (and preliminarily) considers whether the matter at hand involves
a competition or a trademark issue. As an illustration, the Eleventh Circuit
Court characterized as a purely antitrust matter the Morris v PGA case.111
In this case, PGA had refused to grant Morris access to PGA tournaments
unless Morris agreed not to sell the product of PGA’s proprietary RTSScompiled real-time golf scores to non-credentialed-third-party Internet
publishers. Even if in principle the undertaking refused to deal with a
competitor, the conduct was justified under competition law considerations.
The PGA was considered to have met its business justification burden by
showing that the aim of its conduct was to prevent the plaintiff from free
riding on its technology.
The Court begins its analysis with the words “Before discussing the
antitrust issues in this case, it is important to note what this case is not
about. Contrary to the arguments of Morris and its amici curiae, this case is
not about copyright law, the Constitution, the First Amendment, or freedom
107. Nicholas S. Economides, The Economics of Trademarks, 78 TRADEMARK REP. 523, 536
(1988).
108. Milton Handler, Trademarks and Antitrust Laws, 38 TRADEMARK REP. 387, 397 (1948).
109. LADAS, supra note 103, at 1357.
110. Apostolos Chronopoulos, Goodwill Appropriation as a Distinct Theory of Trademark
Liability: A Study on the Misappropriation Rationale in Trademark and Unfair Competition Law, 22
Texas Intellectual Property Law Journal 253, 274 (2014).
111. Morris Corporation v. PGA Tour, 364 F.3d 1288, (11th Cir. 2004).
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of the press in news reporting. This case is a straight-forward antitrust
case . . . .”112
Next, the article examines separately those violations of competition
law that are captured by Article 101 TFEU and by Article 102 TFEU. The
following section will look at the way in which trademark and competition
law have been considered as conflicting in the jurisprudence of the CJEU
in Article 101 and Article 102 TFEU cases, with the purpose of identifying
which sets of values have been considered to prevail.
5. THE HIERARCHY BETWEEN SETS OF RULES
5.1 Article 101 TFEU
Article 101 TFEU is the main provision that comes into play with
regard to trademarks because the way in which trademarks are licensed is
by means of contractual agreements.113 By adopting licensing agreements
undertakings allow the use of trademarks to third parties. The way in which
these agreements are formulated, and in particular the way in which the use
of the is limited for third parties, for instance, by means of exclusive
licenses, may fall foul of Article 101 TFEU and give rise to competition
concerns.
The very first competition law case relating to trademark licenses was
Consten and Grundig.114 Consten was a sole distributor of Grunding
products in the territory of France and it had committed not to stock any
competing product.115 Consten had also undertaken to sell Grundig
products only within the territory covered by the license.116 Grunding,
which was based in Germany and manufactured electronic products,
assigned to Consten the registered trademark GINT in France.117 The
complaint to the Commission was brought by a parallel importer of
Grundig products in France, UNEF, who was accused of infringing
Grundig’s trademark GINT.118
The CJEU was requested to examine an appeal against a European
Commission’s decision that had found the agreement between the exclusive
112. See id. at 1288-1289.
113. Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union prohibits restrictive
agreements that may affect trade between Member States whose object or effect is the prevention,
restriction or distortion of competition within the internal market.
114. Joined Cases 56 & 58/64, Établissements Consten, S.A.R.L. v. Comm’n, 1996 E.C.R.
115. See id. at 303.
116. See id. at 303.
117. See id. at 303.
118. See id. at 303-304.
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distributor and its supplier on the registration and the exclusive use of a
trademark in a Member State aimed at preventing parallel imports.119 After
having established that it is the exercise and not the existence of IP rights
that is affected by EU law, the CJEU considered the agreement to be
susceptible to constitute a breach of Article 101(1) TFEU.120
In Consten & Grundig, the CJEU established that agreements giving
absolute territorial protection to a distributor are restrictive of competition
by object. According to the CJEU,
an agreement between producer and distributor which might tend to
restore the national divisions in trade between Member States might be
such as to frustrate the most fundamental objections of the Community.
The Treaty, whose preamble and content aim at abolishing the barriers
between States, and which in several provisions gives evidence of a stern
attitude with regard to their reappearance, could not allow undertakings
to reconstruct such barriers. Article 85(1) [now 101(1) TFEU] is
designed to pursue this aim, even in the case of agreements between
undertakings placed at different levels in the economic process.121

The CJEU considered that an agreement preventing undertakings
different from the sole distributor from importing products into the
exclusive territory (France, in this case) and the sole distributor from
exporting those products from the exclusive territory to other Member
States was violating Article 101 TFEU.122 More precisely, limitations of
this kind deriving for third parties from the registration in France by
Consten of the GINT trademark were considered to be captured by Article
101 TFEU.123
With regard to the role of the trademark registration, Grundig and
Consten submitted that the contested decision would have deprived
Consten of the power to register the trademark in France, but the CJEU
concluded that it was not possible to allow the trademark registration
provided by an unlawful agreement (in that it was prohibited by
competition law).124 Naturally, the registration in France of the GINT
trademark was affected by the decision of the CJEU only on the basis of
the principle of effectiveness.125 In other words, allowing Consten to use
the trademark registration assigned to it by Grundig to achieve an
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

See id. at 312.
See id. at 340.
See id. at 340.
See id. at 343.
See id. at 344.
See id. at 342.
See id. at 345.
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anticompetitive objective would deprive Article 101 TFEU of its
effectiveness.126
The parties based on Article 36 EEC, aimed at clarifying that the
provisions on the elimination of quantitative restrictions (Articles 30 to 34
EEC) must not be an obstacle to prohibitions or restrictions in respect of
importation, exportation or transit which are justified, inter alia, on grounds
of the protection of industrial and commercial property. In response, the
CJEU clarified that the decision of the Commission did not limit the
granting of property rights that are exclusively owned by the Member
States. On the contrary, the decision of the Commission was aimed at
protecting competition law, whose functioning and enforcement “does not
allow the improper use of rights under any national trade-mark law in order
to frustrate the Community’s law on cartels.”127
In EMI, the CJEU established that cross-licensing of trademark is
prohibited between competitors, because it can lead to market sharing,
captured by Article 101.128 In EMI, the CJEU clarified how the exercise of
a trademark right may, under specific circumstances, constitute an
anticompetitive infringement in those cases in which it “manifests itself as
the subject, the means, or the consequence of a restrictive practice.”129
According to the CJEU, free movement of goods and competition law do
not prevent owners of trademarks in all the EU Member States from
exercising their rights in order to prevent the sale or manufacture by a third
party in the EU of products bearing the same trademark that is owned by a
third party in a third country.130 This conduct could, however, be prohibited
if it was implemented through an agreement or a concerted practice with
the object or effect of isolating or partitioning the internal market.131
Some years after the adoption of the Consten and Grundig decision,
the CJEU confirmed the strict and formalistic approach they adopted in
relation to exclusivity provisions, both in the Campari and in the

126. See id. at 345 stating that:
Although Consten is, by virtue of the registration of the GINT trade-mark, regarded under French law
as the original holder of the rights relating to that trade-mark, the fact nevertheless remains that it was
by virtue of an agreement with Grundig that it was able to effect the registration. That agreement
therefore is one which may be caught by the prohibition in Article 85 (1). The prohibition would be
ineffective if Consten could continue to use the trade-mark to achieve the same object as that pursued
by the agreement which has been held to be unlawful.
127. See id. at 346.
128. Case 51/75, EMI Records Ltd. v. CBS United Kingdom Ltd., 1976 E.C.R. 848.
129. See id. at ¶ 27.
130. See id. at ¶ 38.
131. See id. at ¶ 38.
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Whitbread cases.132 For the promotion of its products (alcoholic liqueurs
used for aperitif under the international trademarks Bitter Campari and
Cordial Campari) Campari-Milano had created a sophisticated network of
exclusive distributors and licensees, adapting the alcoholic content and the
quality of the ingredients according to the country of sale.133 In Campari,
the Commission considered that certain restrictions included in an open
exclusive trademark license, such as:
• the exclusivity commitment whereby the licensor engaged
not to appoint other licensees or to manufacture itself the
products bearing the trademark in the allocated territory;
• a restriction on the licensees to market competing products;
• a prohibition against active sales by the licensees outside
their respective territories;
• restrictions as to the group of customers to which the licensee
engaged to supply only products manufactured by the
licensor;
could infringe Article 101(1) TFEU.134 The Commission justified its view
by pointing out that the prohibition of engaging in active sales outside the
allocated territories prevented Campari-Milano and its licensee from freely
selling their manufactured products within the EU market and, as such,
restrained competition by affecting international trade in the product.135
The Commission, however, accepted that the restrictions could benefit
from an individual exemption under Article 101(3) TFEU. In particular, it
was held by the Commission that the exclusivity granted by CampariMilano contributed to improving the production and the distribution of the
product. Interestingly, the Commission held that, while
a non-competition clause in a licensing agreement concerning industrial
property rights based on the result of a creative activity, such as a patent,
would constitute a barrier to technical and economic progress by
preventing the licensees form taking an interest in other techniques and
products, this is not the case with the licensing agreements under
consideration here. The aim pursued by the parties . . . is to decentralize
manufacture within the EEC and to rationalize the distribution system
linked to it, and thus to promote the sale of Campari-Milano’s Bitter,
manufactured from the same concentrates provided by Campari-Milano,
132. ALISON JONES AND BRENDA SUFRIN, EU COMPETITION LAW: TEXT, CASES, AND MATERIALS
875 (6th ed., 2016).
133. Campari (I) (Cases IV/117, 171, 172, 856, 28.173) Commission Decision 78/253/EEC [1978]
OJ L70/69.
134. See id. at 70-75.
135. See id. at 73-75.
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according to the same mixing process and using the same ingredients,
and bearing the same trademark, as that of the licensor.136

Other restrictions, such as a ban on exports outside the EU, create an
obligation to follow the licensor’s instructions relating to the manufacture
of the product and the quality of the ingredients, an obligation not to
divulge the manufacturing processes to third parties, or an obligation to
spend minimum amounts on advertising, were found to be outside the
scope of Article 101(1) TFEU.137 Particularly, in relation to the use of the
trademark, the Commission appeared to give consideration to the right of
the licensor to exercise a certain degree of control over the quality of the
products manufactured by the licensees, even if this meant that they would
have to buy some essential raw materials from the licensor.138 Interestingly,
the Commission also accepted that a specific group of consumers may
require to be provided by the licensee only with products manufactured by
the licensor, to ensure product consistency, as taste difference were likely
to be present among different manufacturers. The Commission pointed out
that
even though quality standards are observed, it is impossible in particular
to avoid differences in taste between the products of the various
manufacturers. This obligation is thus designed to prevent these
consumers from turning to other competing products and to ensure that
they continue to buy Bitter Campari, with the facility of being able to
obtain stocks from their local dealer. Further, such consumers are not
prevented from freely obtaining the licensees’ own products even though
any such purchase would be on the normal trading conditions applicable
to non-duty-free purchasers.139

On this ground, a ban on active sales outside the allocated territories
can be justified.140 The Commission further considered that the other 3
requirements of Article 101(3) were met. In particular, consumer benefited
directly from the increased quantity of Bitter Campari available as a result
of the licensing agreements and the identified restrictions of competition
were indispensable to the attainment of said benefits. In addition, the
licensing agreements did not eliminate competition in respect of a
substantial part of the Bitter products.141
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
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The Moosehead/Whitbread case concerned a trademark license
agreement between Moosehead and Whitbread, a brewer of Canadian lager
and an English brewer respectively, whereby Whitbread acquired the
exclusive right to manufacture, promote, market, and sell the popular
Moosehead beer brand in the UK, the Channel Islands, and the Isle of Man.
Moosehead intended to penetrate the English market, but significant
barriers to entry at the retail level prevented it from selling its Canadian
lager directly. 142 To avert these difficulties Moosehead entered into an
agreement with Whitbread, under which Whitbread would produce the beer
in compliance with Moosehead’s specifications, and with Moosehead yeast
in exchange for a royalty.143 Through a non-compete obligation Whitbread
had an exclusive right to sell and promote beer under the ‘Moosehead’
trademark, that the Commission found in breach of Article 101(1) TFEU.
However, the agreement benefited from an exemption under Article 101(3),
because of the lively inter-brand competition present at the time in the lager
sector in the UK.144
Although the Commission, in adopting a very formalistic approach,
stated clearly that certain potentially anticompetitive provisions may fall
outside the scope of Article 101 TFEU because they are aimed at protecting
certain interests that are considered important to safeguard.145 These
provisions are, in particular, non-challenge clauses, confidentiality
provisions, and provisions dealing with quality control and manufacturing
standards,146 which immediately relate to the protection of the trademark.
In Moosehead/Whitbread, the Commission concluded that, while nonchallenge clauses as regarding the validity of the trademark may be caught
by Article 101 TFEU, in that case the Moosehead trademark was new to
the UK market of lagers, and, as such, it would not constitute an
appreciable barrier to entry for any newcomers.147
In following case, the CJEU adopted a less lenient approach and
focused on the potential that the exercise of trademark rights has to
contribute to the division of markets and therefore to hamper the freedom
of movement of goods, that is a fundamental staple of the EU internal
market. The potential conflict, and the lesser importance of trademark had
already been noted by the CJEU in Sirena Srl. v Eda:

142.
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The exercise of a trade-mark right is particularly apt to lead to a
partitioning of markets, and thus to impair the free movement of goods
between States which is essential to the Common Market. Moreover, a
trade-mark right is distinguishable in this context from other rights of
industrial and commercial property, inasmuch as the interests protected
by the latter are usually more important, and merit a higher degree of
protection, than the interests protected by an ordinary trade-mark.148

In Sirena, the CJEU went further and identified all theoretical
circumstances in which the exercise of trademark rights could constitute an
infringement of Article 101 TFEU.149 According to the CJEU, a situation
of conflict between the exercise of trademarks and competition law was
likely to arise
from restrictive agreements between proprietors of trade-marks or their
successors in title enabling them to prevent imports from other Member
States. If the combination of assignments to different users of national
trade-marks protecting the same product has the result of re-enacting
impenetrable frontiers between the Member States, such practice may
well affect trade between States, and distort competition in the Common
Market. The matter would be different if, in order to avoid any
partitioning of the market, the agreements concerning the use of national
rights in respect of the same trade-mark were to be effected in such
conditions as to make the general use of trade-mark rights as Community
level compatible with the observance of the conditions of competition
and unity of the market which are so essential to the Common Market
that failure to observe them is penalized by Article 85 [now Article 101
TFEU] by a declaration that they are automatically void.150

Later on, the CJEU adopted a softer approach to assignments of
trademarks to undertakings operating in different Member States.151 While
this practice has undoubtedly the potential to compartmentalize the market,
the Court clarified in IHT v Ideal-standard that in order to determine
whether a trademark assignment could be treated as having an
anticompetitive effect, it is necessary to look at the context, by taking into
consideration the commitment underlying the assignment, the intention of
the parties and the consideration for the assignment.152
In Nungesser, the CJEU reaffirmed the position adopted in Consten
and Grundig,153 according to which the granting of absolute territorial
148.
149.
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protection to a licensee to enable the control and prevention of parallel
imports leads to compartmentalization of national markets, contrary to the
gist of the EU Treaties.154 The CJEU confirmed the lack of the conditions
to grant an exemption, claiming that the indispensability of the restriction
for the improvement of production or distribution of the product had not
been demonstrated.155
In the Pronuptia de Paris preliminary ruling, the CJEU was requested,
by an order of the Bundesgerichtshof Frankfurt am Main, to assess whether
certain categories of exclusive dealing agreements could be included in
franchise agreement or whether they violated Article 101 TFEU.156 The
franchisor, Pronuptia de Paris GmbH, Frankfurt am Main, a subsidiary of a
homonymous French company, had concluded three franchising
agreements with the franchisee Mrs. Schillgalis, licensing to her the
trademark for the sale of wedding dresses and other items of clothing
especially created for marital celebrations, and covering three different
territories (Hamburg, Oldenburg and Hanover). With the conclusion of the
franchising agreements, the franchisor granted the franchisee, in respect of
the territories, the exclusive right to use the trade-mark “Pronuptia de
Paris” for the marketing of her goods and services and the right to
advertise; undertook not to open any other Pronuptia shops in the assigned
territories or to provide goods or services to third parties in those
territories; while the franchisee committed to sell the goods, using the trade
name and trade-mark “Pronuptia de Paris”, to purchase from the franchisor
80% of wedding dresses and accessories, together with a proportion of
cocktail and evening dresses to be set by the franchisee herself, and to
purchase the remainder only from suppliers approved by the franchisor, to
advertise in the territories only with the franchisor's agreement, and in any
event to harmonize that advertising with the franchisor's international and
national advertising, to distribute catalogues and other publicity material
provided by the franchisor to the best of her abilities and in general to
apply the business methods imparted to her by the franchisor.
A franchising agreement is aimed at creating a network of vertical
agreements which ensures that certain standards in the distribution of the
products are respected. This network, however, tends to strengthen the
franchisor’s competitive power at the horizontal level, because it provides
it with a strong brand vouching for its reliability and quality.157 According
154.
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to the franchisor in this case, to ensure the operation of this agreement,
certain legal clauses are essential: exclusive delivery and supply
obligations, because they allow to maintain a standard selection of goods in
the stores; uniform advertising and shop layout, because they reinforce the
credibility of the franchisee without harming the image of the franchisor;
and prohibition to sell goods supplied under the franchising agreement in
other shops.158 These clauses, by their very nature, seem to be necessary
for the normal operation of the franchising agreement and could be
excluded by the scope of Article 101 TFEU.159
The CJEU focused on the clauses that were susceptible to
compartmentalize the market and found that the clause prohibiting the
franchisee from opening another Pronuptia shop combined with the clause
granting the franchisee, in respect of the territories, the exclusive right to
use the trademark “Pronuptia de Paris” for the marketing of goods and
services and the right to advertise could result in a market sharing practice
and in a restriction of competition within the network of franchisee.160
Such practice could possibly prevent other franchisee from establishing
themselves in other Member States, thus affecting trade between Member
States. This case suggests a changed approach on the part of the CJEU in
the prioritization of the protection of competition law interests over the
safeguard of trademark rights. Agreements aimed at protecting the knowhow of the franchisor and the reputation and uniformity of the franchise are
prima facie compatible with Article 101(1) TFEU.161
Another important intersection between trademarks and Article 101
TFEU occurs with regard to trademark delimitation agreements or
trademark settlements, whereby the owners of trademarks capable of being
confused enter into agreements reciprocally limiting the use of their
respective trademark. In BAT, BAT Cigaretten-Fabriken GmbH, holder of
the Dorcet trademark in Germany, claimed that the trademark ‘Toltecs’
belonging to the Dutch exporter of cut tobacco Sergers was confusingly
similar to his trademark.162 The two companies settled their dispute by
putting a quantitative limit to the types of tobacco that Sergers could export
to Germany under the Toltecs trademark.163 In addition, the distributors
used by Sergers were to be approved by BAT.164 Subsequently, difficulties
158.
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arose in the approval of distributors for Germany by BAT and Sergers
submitted a complaint to the Commission.165
The CJEU upheld the Commission decision with regard to the
ambivalent nature of delimitation agreements, considering that they may be
lawful if they are aimed at allocating the ambit of operation of different
trademarks in the interest of the parties and are intended to avoid confusion
or controversy between them.166 However, such agreements, like any other,
are subject to the scrutiny of the European Commission under Article 101
TFEU, in particular because they can be conducive to the partitioning of
market or other restrictions of competition.167
The confirmation that the agreement could restrain competition was
also based, according to the Commission, on the observation that
Segers is the proprietor of a trade mark legally acquired and used in a
Member State and BAT . . . is the proprietor of an unused, dormant,
trade mark which is liable to be removed from the register upon
application by any interested party. BAT’s opposition, as part of its
efforts to control the distribution of Segers’ products, constitutes an
abuse of the rights conferred upon it by its trade mark ownership.168

From subsequent case law, it appears that the Commission tend to
consider that delimitation agreements are outside the scope of Article
101(1) in those cases where there is a genuine risk of confusion between
the parties and the agreements do not have the effect of segmenting the
internal market.169
5.2 Article 102 TFEU
The other way in which a clash between competition law and
trademarks may arise is in the case of an abuse of a dominant position.170
While cases of exploitation of a dominant position granted by an IP right
have been very common (Bronner,171 Magill,172 Microsoft173), the use of a

165. See id at 376.
166. See id. at 380.
167. See id. 385.
168. See id. at 385-386.
169. See Sirdar-Phildar (IV/27.879) Commission Decision 75/297/EEC OJ L 125, 16.5.1975, p.
27–30.
170. Article 102 TFEU prohibits any abuse of dominant position that affect trade between Member
States.
171. Case C-7/97, Oscar Bronner v. Mediaprint, 1998 E.C.R. I-7817.
172. Magill TV Guide/ITP, BBC and RTE (IV/31.851) Commission Decision 89/205/EEC [1988]
OJ L 78, 21.3.1989, p. 43–51.
173. Case T-201/04, Microsoft v. Comm’n, 2007, E.C.R. II-3619.
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trademark in this specific sense has been less typical than in Article 101
TFEU cases.
The most topical cases of refusal to license and refusal to provide
interoperability relate to patents, where the dominant undertaking has the
most significant share of market and makes use of such market power to
foreclose competitors or increase prices.174 The use of a trademark to
artificially create barriers to entry in a market that is already dominated by
an undertaking seems to have been less frequent in reality.175
In a seminal decision relating to patents in Parke Davis, the CJEU
restated the Grundig & Consten principle according to which the nature
and the function of community law on competition do not permit rights
arising under national trademark law to be improperly exercised so as to
render Community law on cartels ineffective.176 In particular, the CJEU
extended the reasoning elaborated in relation to Article 101 TFEU in
Consten & Gruding, adapting to the framework of Article 102 TFEU and
underlying the importance of distinguishing between the holding of an IP
right and its exercise.177
In Sirena v Eda, the CJEU recalled the theoretical circumstances in
which the exercise of a trademark right is liable to be found incompatible
with Article 102 TFEU.178 It stated that the provision on abuse of
dominance required the three specific conditions of the existence of a
dominant position, its abuse, and the possibility that trade between Member
States may be affected.179 Additionally, the CJEU explained that the first
requirement was not met merely because of the ownership of a trademark
or because the owner was entitled to prevent third parties from producing
or distributing products bearing the same trademark in the territory of a
Member State.180 The CJEU also specified that “as regards the abuse of a
dominant position, although the price level of the product may not of itself
necessarily suffice to disclose such an abuse, it may, however, if unjustified

174. Case 24/67, Parke, Davis and Co. v Probel, Reese, Beintema-Interpharm and Centrafarm,
1968 E.C.R. 55.
175. Sven Bostyn and Nicolas Petit, Patent=Monopoly: A Legal Fiction (December 31,2013).
Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract-2373471 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2373471.
176. See id. at 65.
177. Aashit Shah, The Abuse of Dominant Position” under Article 82 of the Treaty of the
European Community: Impact on Licensing of Intellectual Property Rights, 3 CHICAGO-KENT JOURNAL
OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 41, 47 (2003).
178. Case 40/70, supra note 148, at ¶15.
179. See id. at ¶ 15.
180. See id. at ¶ 16.
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by any objective criteria, and if it is particularly high, be a determining
factor.”181
On the issue of the relation between the holding of a trademark and
the holding of a dominant position in the market, the CJEU clarified in EMI
that
Although the trade mark right confers upon its proprietor a special
position within the protected territory this, however, does not imply the
existence of a dominant position within the meaning of [Article 86] (now
102 TFEU), in particular where, as in the present case, several
undertakings whose economic strength is comparable to that of the
proprietor of the mark operate in the market for the products in question
and are in a position to compete with the said proprietor.182

The Court also restated the lack of correlation between being the
holder of a trademark and being able to commit an infringement of
competition law.183 In Hoffman v. Centrafarm, the CJEU was requested to
clarify whether the person entitled to a trademark right protected both in
Member State A and in Member State B. It was unclear if this situation
could prevent a parallel importer from: (i) buying from the proprietor of the
mark or with his consent in Member State A of the Community medicinal
preparations, and (ii) from providing them with new packaging, affixing to
such packaging the proprietor's trademark and importing the preparations
distinguished in this manner into Member State B.184 The CJEU was also
requested to clarify whether this conduct is to be deemed an abuse of a
dominant position under Article 102 TFEU.185
The Court ruled that the described conduct, although not prohibited
per se, may constitute an abuse of a dominant position if (1) the use of the
trademark right by the proprietor will contribute to the artificial partitioning
of the markets between Member States; (2) the repackaging cannot
adversely affect the original condition of the product; (3) the proprietor of
the mark receives prior notice of the marketing of the repackaged product;
and (4) it is stated on the new packaging by whom the product has been
repackaged.186 According to the Court:
to the extent to which the exercise of a trademark right is lawful in
accordance with the provisions of Article 36 of the Treaty, such exercise
is not contrary to Article 86 of the Treaty on the sole ground that it is act
181.
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of an undertaking occupying a dominant position on the market if the
trademark right has not been used as an instrument for the abuse of such
a position.187

In Volvo v Veng, the CJEU examined a case concerning a substantial
car manufacturer holding registered designs, which conferred on it the
exclusive right to make and import replacement body panels required to
affect repair of the body of a car that it manufactured.188 After restating that
it is for the national law system to determine the terms and conditions of
the protection of designs and models, the Court proceeded to address the
question of whether it is a prima facie abuse of a dominant position to
refuse to license others to supply the body parts incorporating the design,
even in the event that they are willing to pay reasonable royalties.189 The
Court concluded that the conduct is not in itself an abuse of dominant
position. The following conducts could have been identified as violating
Article 86, now 102 TFEU, according to the CJEU: “the arbitrary refusal to
supply spare parts to independent repairers, the fixing of prices for spare
parts at an unfair level or a decision no longer to produce spare parts for a
particular model even though many cars of that model are still in
circulation, provided that such conduct is liable to affect trade between
Member States.”190
In Der Grüne Punkt, Duales System Deutschland provided a
managing packaging collection service for recycling.191 On 12 June 1991,
the German Government adopted an Ordinance limiting the environmental
impact of packaging waste, providing for manufacturers and distributors of
packaging to take back and recover used sales packaging outside the public
waste disposal system free of charge.192 By entering into an agreement with
Duales System Deutschland, manufacturers and distributors could, in return
for a fee, display the “Der Grüne Punkt” logo on the packaging covered by
the recycling system that Duales System Deutschland managed. Duales
System Deutschland had registered the “Der Grüne Punkt” logo in
Germany:193

187. Case102/77, supra note 56, at 1167.
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According to the Commission decision, Duales System Deutschland
enjoyed a dominant position, being the only company to offer its service
(the “exemption system”) in Germany, collecting around 70% of sales
packaging in Germany and around 82% of sales packaging from final
consumers in Germany.194 The Commission determined that Duales
System Deutschland abused its dominant position based on the fact that the
fee charged by Duales System Deutschland to manufacturers and
distributors participating in the DSD system was tied “not to the actual use
of that system but is calculated on the basis of the number of packages
bearing the DGP logo which those manufacturers and distributors put into
circulation in Germany.”195 By requiring manufacturers and distributors
participating in the DSD system to affix the DGP logo to all packaging
notified to DSD and intended for consumption in Germany, Duales System
Deutschland exploited its dominant position in the market.196 The
investigation carried out by the Commission led to the conclusion that the
method of calculation of the fee paid to DSD constituted an obstacle to the
desire of certain packaging manufacturers, who were customers of the DSD
system, to be able to make use of their own self-management solution or of
another exemption system in respect to some of the packaging put into
circulation by them, thus depriving them of any choice.
The Court of First Instance, upheld by the CJEU, considered that the
conduct of DSD consisting in asking for payment of a fee for all packaging
bearing the DGP logo and put into circulation in Germany, even where
customers of the company showed that they do not use the DGP system for
some or all of that packaging, was an abuse of a dominant position.197
6. INSTEAD OF CONCLUSION: COMPETITION AS A “SILENT”
CONSIDERATION
In defining the relationship between competition law and trademarks,
the CJEU consistently refused to accept that the specific function of
trademark (in particular, guaranteeing the origin of the product for the
consumers) could “provide an immunity from unwarrantable interference
when its exercise was contrary to Article 101.”198 The same reasoning is
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also valid for the application of Article 102 TFEU.199 In other words, as it
appears from the above analysis that the CJEU has been very respectful
both of trademark right and of the need to protect competition law.
As it emerges from the above analysis, considerations relating to the
protection or the fostering of innovation are entirely missing in relation to
trademarks. In relation to trademarks, the CJEU has moved from a very
strict approach in a first body of case law, where the logic of the protection
of the freedom of circulation of goods have been considered prevalent, to a
more relaxed approach. Simultaneously, the CJEU has shown an increased
consideration for the interests of the trademark owner and admitted the
possibility that specific clauses aimed at the protection of know-how or the
reputation and uniformity of the distribution could be considered
compatible with Article 101(1) TFEU.200
In the first years of the establishment of the European Community,
competition law tended to suspiciously view the protection of trademark,
seeing it as directly opposed to the goals of competition law.201 This view
has been abandoned and substituted by a more synthetic approach in which
the goals of trademark law and competition law are not incompatible but
may be pursued conjunctly. Whenever requested to strike a balance
between trademarks and competition law, the CJEU has proceeded to
identify whether an infringement of competition law stricto sensu had been
committed by means of the exercise of a trademark right.202 All the factual
and economic circumstances of the case were given consideration to allow
the judge to identify whether the trademark protection or the competition
law considerations should prevail.203 The shift towards a more careful
consideration for the protection of the trademark owner has also
historically coincided with a more accomplished internal market, in which
the goal of the protection of the freedom of circulation of good has become
a less pressing one, with the result that that aim was no longer the most
prominent one in guiding the reasoning of the CJEU.204
The CJEU also moved towards a more thorough consideration of the
legal and economic context, and, importantly, a more economic-oriented
analysis of the potential competition restriction.205 In the Viking Gas case,
the CJEU considered that a balance was to be found between the interest on
199.
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the part of the licensee of the trademark constituted by the shape of a
composite bottle and the owner of the trademarks affixed to that bottle,
and, on the other hand, the interest of the purchasers of those bottles to
fully enjoy their property rights in those bottles and, aligned to this latter,
the general interest in maintaining undistorted competition.206 The CJEU,
after restating that the sale of the bottle, by realizing the economic value of
the trademark, exhausts the exclusive rights to that trademark,207 considered
the interests of the consumers and the market.
While it is very common that the full enjoyment of a property right is
limited by a related trademark rights, the CJEU noted that to allow the
licensee of the trademark right constituted by the shape of the composite
bottle and proprietor of the marks affixed to that bottle to prevent, on the
basis of the rights relating to those marks, the bottles from being refilled
would unduly reduce competition on the downstream market for the
refilling of gas bottles, and would even create the risk of that market’s
being closed off if the licensee and proprietor were to succeed in imposing
its bottle because of its specific technical characteristics, the protection of
which is not the purpose of trademark law.208 That risk is, moreover,
increased by virtue of the fact that the cost of the composite bottle is much
more than the gas and that the purchaser, in order to regain a free choice of
gas supplier, would have to forgo the initial outlay made in purchasing the
bottle, the recouping of which requires the bottle to be reused a sufficient
number of times.209 By looking at the consequences on the market, the
CJEU concluded that the sale of the composite bottle must be considered to
exhausts the rights of the licensee.210
Competition considerations guide the decision of the CJEU in matter
that are almost exclusively hinging upon trademark law. While in
competition law cases, the progressively more evident presence of
trademark considerations is apparent, this is not the case in the trademark
jurisprudence, where competition law consideration remains silent, or at
least very indirectly address in the reasoning.
As it has been showed above, the “internalization” of competition law
considerations when dealing with trademark issues and vice versa certainly
affects the reasoning of the Court of Justice.211 The choice of considering
one issue from the point of view of either trademark law or competition law
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empowers the CJEU to address the same issue in a completely different
manner and come to a different conclusion. It remains to be assessed
whether, in future cases, the characterization of a case as an IP or a
competition law case by the CJEU will also have a bearing, given the
profound consequences for the structure of the analysis that is performed
by the adjudicator, and, in turn, on the final outcome of the case of such a
choice.

